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µ7KH'HDGOLHVW7KLQJWKDW.HHSVWKH6HDV¶ 
The Technology, Tactics and Terror of the Submarine in War Illustrated Magazine 
Jonathan Rayner, University of Sheffield 
 
Introduction 
This paper explores the developing representation of the submarine and submarine warfare in 
the popular British First World War publication War Illustrated.  In reporting on the varied and 
YDORULVHGDFWLYLWLHVRIWKH5R\DO1DY\¶VVXEPDULQHVDQGGHSLFWLQJWKHSHULOHPERGLHGE\the 
predations of German U boats, War Illustrated enthusiastically embraced the submarine as a 
subject for popular media representation. :LWKLQ WKH PDJD]LQH¶V SDJHV the submarine as a 
scientific apparatus and an offensive weapon became the focus for celebration, pride, hatred 
and fear in line with contemporary propaganda discourses, and in tune with related perspectives 
upon the place and significance of national character, morality and technology in the present 
ZDU $VVXFK WKHVXEPDULQH¶VSLYRWDO UROH LQ WKH)LUVW:RUOG:DUDQG LWVHPHUJHQFHDQG
evaluation within twentieth century warfare, can be traced through the problematic and 
contradictory popular responses to its unique capabilities and contribution to the naval 
campaign in this popular contemporary source. Ironically this coverage itself mimics the 
operation of the submarines of both sides, being marked by conspicuous, visible and overt 
histories, and covert, submerged and inferential narratives. In Britain, the dismissive evaluation 
RIWKHVXEPDULQHDVµWKHZHDSRQRIWKHZHDNHUQDYDOSRZHU¶, along with attempts by the Royal 
Navy to tailor the submarine to its global naval operations, provoked uncertainty as to its place 
and purpose in war, and consequently ambiguity in its portrayal within this British publication.1 
 
A perhaps predictable example of the manner in which the submarine gained its infamous 
foregrounding in the consciousness of War Illustrated¶VUHDGHUVKLSFDQEHVHHQ in the way in 
which the magazine portrayed the controversial torpedoing by U-20 of the liner Lusitania in 
May 1915. Although this well-known event became the focus of both contemporary and 
retrospective commentary because of its significance within the wider conflict, what was most 
prominent in War Illustrated¶s treatment was the direct linkagHWKHPDJD]LQH¶VDUWLFOHFUHDWHG 
between the sinking and the country and leader of Germany. Accompanying a photograph of 
the interment of 64 victims of the sinking (fig.1) was text which labelled the Kaiser (held 
SHUVRQDOO\UHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKHDWURFLW\WKHµ3LUDWH(PSHURU¶DOHDGHUµPRUHWHUULEOHthan Attila, 
more ruthless than Herod or Nero¶2 Picturing him wearing the uniform of the µ'HDWK¶V+HDG 
+XVVDUV¶WKHFDSWLRQDVVHUWHG µWKH-ROO\5RJHULVWKHPRVWDSSURSULDWHHQVLJQIRUWKH8QGHUVHD
+XQV¶ This example epitomised the visual and verbal demonization of the enemy, its leader 
and its submarines within contemporary British news publications, which strove to suggest a 
deliberate uniformity of ruthless intention and barbaric execution in the use of the German U-
boat. The frequent use of epithets and slurs of piracy and murder attached to U-boat attacks 
clearly accrued powerfully around an incident like the sinking of the Lusitania. However, the 
IRUHJURXQGLQJRIWKH'HDWK¶V+HDGLQVLJQLDDQGWKHDWWULEXWLRQRIWKH-olly Roger to the U-boat 
ignored or obscured the adoption of this flag as a mark of a successfully completed patrol by 
%ULWLVKVXEPDULQHVD\HDUEHIRUH WKH/XVLWDQLD¶V VLQNLQJ3 This marked contrast between an 
                                                          
1
 Duncan Redford, The Submarine: A Cultural History from the Great War to Nuclear Combat (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 2015), pp.xv-xvi. 
2
 $QRQ\PRXVµ³0\+DQGLZRUN´± %\WKH3LUDWH(PSHURU¶The War Illustrated vol.2 n.40 (22 May 1915), 
p.319. 
3
 Richard Compton-Hall, Submarines at War 1939-45 (Penzance: Periscope Publishing Ltd., 2004), p.62. 
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icon ascribed as a symbol of universal national disgrace, and the same image embraced as an 
individual and elitist distinction, illustrates the contradictions at work contemporarily, and 
retrospectively in the depiction of the submarine. 
 
 
Fig.1 22 May 1915 µ³0\+DQGLZRUN´± %\WKH3LUDWH(PSHURU¶ (University of Sheffield Special Collections) 
 
 
War Illustrated  ZDVµa pictorial record RIWKHFRQIOLFWRIWKHQDWLRQV¶, incorporating abundant 
maps, photographs and illustrations, and the work of war artists alongside weekly reporting, 
editorials and commentaries on the conduct and consequences of the war. Its articles included 
contributions and columns from notable figures, such as Sidney Low, H.G. Wells, Jerome K. 
Jerome, Fred T. Jane and Carlyon Bellairs. It was published by William Berry, then owner of 
the Daily Telegraph and first appeared on 22 August 1914.  By the war¶s end, its weekly 
circulation had risen to 750,000.4 Through most of the conflict the magazine was sold at a price 
of two pence (2d.), rising to three pence by 1918. This retail price for a weekly publication, in 
                                                          
4
 Anonymousµ7KH3UHVVZDU:HHNOLHV¶Time Magazine 25 September, 1939. 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,761998,00.html (Accessed 09/03/2013). 
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an era when daily newspapers typically sold for a penny (1d.) suggests, along with the length 
and vocabulary employed in its articles, that an adult, middle-class readership was its target 
audience, though its highly illustrated form meant that it may well have also appealed to a 
younger or less weOOHGXFDWHGDXGLHQFH$UHJXODUZHHNO\FROXPQDGGUHVVLQJWKHµ:DUE\6HD¶ 
was introduced in the first twelve months, and another consistent feature was the special 
WUHDWPHQWRIRXWVWDQGLQJUHFHQWHYHQWVLQDVHULHVHQWLWOHGµ7KH*UHDW(SLVRGHVRIWKH:DU¶± 
DQH[DPSOHRIZKLFKZDVµ7KH'HPRQLDFDO'HVWUXFWLRQRIWKH/XVLWDQLD¶5 
 
Re-evaluating War Illustrated now in the circumstances of the present centenary of the conflict 
provides the opportunity for appreciation of the form and extent of contemporary reporting, 
extant knowledge and conscious narrativisation of the war, tempered with an informed 
retrospection. It is worth noting that the magazine was not simply, or not entirely, a conformist 
propaganda organ obediently reiterating establishment discourses:  it also engaged in inquiries 
into and critical commentary upon the conduct and controversies of the war, such as the 
handling of the disastrous Dardanelles campaign in 1915 and the uncertain outcome of the 
Battle of Jutland in 1916. While its capacity and readiness to demonise the enemies of the 
Central Powers were not in doubt, it also articulated and enabled judicious, democratic debate 
upon the management or alleged mismanagement of the war.  Both of these facets were relevant 
to the reporting of the perceived and actual danger embodied by the German U-boats.  In this 
ZD\WKHPDJD]LQH¶V illustrated form, its complex textual interplay of word and image (and the 
often revealing distinction between the image types it used, such as war artists¶ work, 
illustrations and photography), can be seen to be crucial to the views it espoused, the themes it 
pursued and the voices it raised as the war developed. 
 
 
The German U-Boat 
,QWHUPVRIWKHVSHFLILFUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKHVXEPDULQH¶VSODFHZLWKLQWKHFRQIOLFWDQHDUO\
example (from the very first edition) illustrated the contradictory terms under which the craft 
can be depicted.  While illustrating and GHVFULELQJWKHRSHUDWLQJSURFHGXUHVRIµSRZHUIXOQHZ
VXEPDULQHV¶, WKH DUWLFOH DWWHVWV WKDW SHUIRUPDQFH GHWDLOV DUH DV DPRQJVW µWKH PRVW MHDORXVO\
JXDUGHGRI*RYHUQPHQWVHFUHWV¶.6 However, this technological mystification of the submarine 
is alloyed with the reassuring defeat of this menacing marvel in an account of µthe first 
HQFRXQWHU EHWZHHQ >%ULWLVK@ ZDUVKLS DQG >*HUPDQ@ VXEPDULQH¶.7 Speculation upon the 
VXEPDULQH¶VUROHDQGLPSDFWLQQDYDOZDUIDUHKDGEHHQPDUNHGZLWKLQ5R\DO1DY\FLUFOHVQRW
least because no effective countermeasures had been developed in the period immediately 
preceding the First World War: 
 
No active remedy for attacks from submarines existed, but their lack of speed, 
which prevented them from accompanying a battle fleet, meant that the threat posed 
by such warships in a general engagement was probably regarded as negligible, at 
least for the time being.8  
 
                                                          
5
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The PDJD]LQH¶Vtext detailed the instant taming of the threatening craft by HMS Birmingham¶V
gunners, who disabled the U-ERDW¶VSHULVFRSHZLWK µH[WUDRUGLQDU\DFFXUDF\RIDLP¶: noting pre-
war speculation as to the danger the submarine was presumed to pose, this story stated 
encouragingly WKDWµWKLVPDWWHU¶KDVEHHQµGHFLGHGin the first historic skirmish¶.9 Unsuccessful 
attacks upon British ships by German submarines in August 1914, the sinking of U-15 by HMS 
Birmingham (actually accomplished by ramming), and the entirely unmolested passage of the 
British Expeditionary Force to France, appeared to confirm this view of the impotence of the 
U-boat.10 
A more sombre awakening to the submarine threat occurred barely two months later with the 
reporting of the sinking of the three cruisers HMS Aboukir, Cressy and Hogue by U-9 through 
a variegated page of illustrations.11 Alongside the inclusion of the work of a German artist 
showing the joyous welcome offered to U-9 and its crew on their return to Wilhelmshaven 
were photographs of the cruiser HMS Hawke, another recent victim of submarine attack, and 
some of her surviving crewmembers. All that this article could salvage from this debacle, µa 
deplorable incident [and@WKHILUVWUHDOVKRFNWRWKH1DY\¶12, are the respectful phrases (credited 
to U-9¶VFRPPDQGHU2WWR:HGGLQJHQDFNQRZOHGJLQJWKHEUDYHU\RIWKHVKLSV¶Frews as µWUXH
to WKHLU FRXQWU\¶V VHD WUDGLWLRQV¶.13 The foregrounding in this article of notions of naval 
tradition, in the face of entirely new weapons and the intractable threats they manifested to 
conventional warships, underlined the problematic image and perception of the Royal Navy in 
a transitional, technological age. 
By the start of the following year, gathering awareness and anxiety about the impact of the 
submarine was clearly discernible in the devotion of both covers of the edition from 27 
February 1915 to the gathering threat to merchant shipping. 7KHIURQWFRYHUVKRZVDQDUWLVW¶V
LOOXVWUDWLRQRIµ%UDYH%ULWLVK0HUFKDQW6DLORUVRQWKHORRN-RXWIRU*HUPDQ3LUDWHV¶ZKLOHWKH
back cover (fig.2) FRQVLVWVRI DPDS VKRZLQJ µ7KH6XEPDULQH³%ORFNDGH´of Our Sea-Girt 
Isles¶.14 ,QWKLVLQVWDQFHµEORFNDGH¶ZDVSHUKDSV placed in speech marks because the German 
submarine campaign could not be considered the material or moral equal to the blockade 
imposed by British surface warships on Germany, or because a starvation-inducing blockade 
of the British Isles as yet represented an unthinkable proposition. In this treatment the 
submarine was connected directly to other instances of German atrocity by the indication of a 
line of what was termed µVXEPDULQH IULJKWIXOQHVV¶, along which individual sinkings were 
marked and dated.  This balder, factual accounting of the unseen impact of submarine attacks 
VWRRG LQ FRQWUDVW WR WKH HPRWLYH IURQW FRYHU LOOXVWUDWLRQ¶V IUR]HQ PRPHQW of human drama 
(fig.3). In the picture the members of the bridge crew of the merchant ship were seen gesturing 
at an unknown object, looking through binoculars, reaching for the engine telegraph, and 
WXUQLQJ WKHVKLS¶VZKHHO LQ UHVSRQVH WR WKH invisible threat. The unspecified source of their 
anxiety µ,V LW D6XEPDULQH"¶ DQG WKHXQNQRZQ outcome of the depicted event, created an 
DWPRVSKHUH RI PHQDFH DQG XQFHUWDLQW\ ZKLFK HPSKDVLVHG WKH PHQ¶V EUDYHU\ WKURXJK
exacerbating the insidious threat.  The didactic address evinced by these illustrations, and their 
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Fig.  )HEUXDU\  µ7KH 6XEPDULQH ³%ORFNDGH´ RI 2XU 6HD-*LUW ,VOHV¶ (University of Sheffield Special 
Collections) 
 
DFNQRZOHGJHPHQWRIWKHVXEPDULQH¶VSRZHURILQYLVLELOLW\ZHUHPDWFKHGE\DQRWKHUFRYHUby 
another cover illustration from spring 1915 (fig. 4).  The cover illustration provided a 
miraculous (and inaccurate) disclosure of the interior of the submerged submarine to 
characterise the covert threat of the enemy (identified inferentially through the Germanic 
uniforms of the crew members, and by the well-defined silhouettes of the distant but apparently 
oblivious British warships in the background). Again, the inferred underhanded-ness and 
GDQJHURIWKHVXEPDULQHZDVHPEHGGHGLQWKHLOOXVWUDWLRQ¶VFDSWLRQZKLFKUHDGµ,QWKHVPDOO
Conning-7RZHU RI D 6XEPDULQH ZKHQFH KDYRF WR JUHDW 6XUIDFH 6KLSV LV ODXQFKHG¶15 The 
revelatory nature of the image, and the self-conscious diction of its caption, again endowed the 
submarine with an aura of uncanny potency, appearing to re-invoke visually the well-known 
tragedy of Aboukir, Cressy and Hogue in its inclusion of the line of three cruiser-type ships 
unaware of their proximity to and observation by the lurking U-boat. 
 
+HUHWKHPDJD]LQH¶VFRPPHQWDU\DQGDJJUDQGL]HPHQWRIWKH*HUPDQVXEPDULQHDSSHDUHGWR
mirror the pre-war and early war perceptions of the threat it posed to warships, rather than 
                                                          
15
 The War Illustrated vol.2 n.36 (24 April 1915). 
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merchant ships. Although the U-boat would eventually become the predominant strategic threat 
to the Allied cause through its dedication to the destruction of merchant shipping, before and 
during the early part of the war it was assumed that U-boat operations could and would exert a 
crucial strategic influence at sea in an entirely different fashion: 
 
 
)LJ)HEUXDU\µ³Is it a Submarine?´± Brave British Merchant Sailors on the look-out for German Pirates¶
(University of Sheffield Special Collections) 
 
-HOOLFRH¶V GHWHUPLQDWLRQ QRW WR KD]DUG KLV FDSLWDO-ship superiority to the risk of 
underwater damage from torpedoes, mines, or submarine-and-mine traps. He 
believed, as did the Admiralty, that the enemy, to compensate for numerical 
inferiority in ships, would employ these weapons to equalize their strength. His 
UHVSHFW IRU WKH WRUSHGR >«@ WKH PLQH DQG WKH VXEPDULQH DOWKRXJK IXOO ZDU
7 
 
experience was to prove it an exaggerated one in some respects, was shared by the 
whole navy.16 
 
 
)LJ  $SULO  µ,Q WKe small Conning-Tower of a Submarine whence havoc to great Surface Ships is 
ODXQFKHG¶8QLYHUVLW\RI6KHIILHOG6SHFLDO&ROOHFWLRQV 
 
Despite the fact that, in the event, no modern Allied capital ship was to be lost to direct 
submarine torpedo attack during the entire war (discounting the sinking of the dreadnought 
HMS Audacious to a submarine-laid mine in 191417IHDURIWKHHURVLRQRIWKH*UDQG)OHHW¶V
supremacy by submarine attritional tactics, which the reporting of the sinkings of elderly 
cruisers like Aboukir, Cressy , Hogue, Hawke and Pathfinder revived, maintained not only the 
status of the U-boat threat in the public mind, but also the supposed strategic value of the 
dreadnought fleet, despite the danger, real and perceived, which the U-boat posed to commerce. 
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Such impactful, visual representation of the real and imagined submarine threat appears all the 
PRUHUHPDUNDEOHLQUHWURVSHFWJLYHQWKHPDJD]LQH¶VIUHTXHQWGLPLQXWLRQRIWKHSUREOHPSRVHG
by the U-boats in its reporting and regular columns. In September of the same year as the 
covered discussed above appeared, &DUO\RQ%HOODLUVLQµ7KH:DU$W6HD¶FROXPQKDGUHSHDWHG
official remarks that the diversion of U-boats from attacks on warships to attacks on merchant 
VKLSVZDVµDQDEVROXWHJDLQWRWKHFDXVHRIWKH$OOLHV¶DQGWKDW:LQVWRQ&KXUFKLOOKDGVWDWHG
WKDWWKHµWKHVXEPDULQHPHQDFHKDGEHen fixed within definite limits¶.18  %HOODLUV¶VWDQGLQJDV
a former QDYDORIILFHU WKHPDJD]LQH¶VFRUUHVSRQGHQW IRUPDULWLPHDIIDLUVDQGDPHPEHURI
parliament, made his dismissal of the danger posed by the U-boat appear both informed and 
official, despite its amplification in War Illustrated¶V YLVXDO PDWHULDOV The heightened 
LOOXVWUDWLRQV DGRSWHG IRU WKHPDJD]LQH¶VZHHNO\ FRYHUV also stood in marked contrast to its 
frequent use of photographs.  Where WKH PDJD]LQH¶V IURQW FRYHUV DOZD\V LQFRUSRUDWHG 
impassioned, artistic renditions of symbolic figures or representative scenes rather than of 
actual, verifiable events, its integration of photographic images can be seen to provide a 
differing contributory power to its verbal propagandist rhetoric.  
 
A page of photographs from 1916 depicting the stages of an actual sinking of a neutral merchant 
ship, and the rescue of its survivors by a British steamer, epitomised this alternate strand of the 
PDJD]LQH¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOVWUDWHJ\. $OWKRXJKWKHSDJH¶VKHDGOLQHWLWOHµ*HUPDQ\¶V3LUDWLFDO
Crimes Exposed by the &DPHUD¶19 was redolent of negative propaganda, the images 
themselves appeared starkly uninflected. Taken from the deck of the British ship, with its own 
FUHZDQRQ\PLVHGLQVLOKRXHWWH WKHSKRWRJUDSKVEODQNO\UHFRUGWKHQHXWUDOVKLS¶VVLQNLQJLQ 
factual reportage which, as the accompanying brief captions suggest, µIRUP D F\QLFDO
FRPPHQWDU\RQ*HUPDQ\¶VSURIHVVHGFRQFHVVLRQV WR$PHULFD¶VSURWHVWV¶20 7KHPDJD]LQH¶V
exploitation of these visual and verbal alternatives in the representation of the U-boat was 
UHSHDWHG LQ LWV GHSLFWLRQV DQG UHSRUWLQJ RI WKH 5R\DO 1DY\¶V VXEPDULQHV Where the 
technological advances represented by the submarine were both acknowledged and feared in 
their embodiment in the U-ERDW¶s furtiveness and lethality, the same attributes of modernity 
and innovation were wedded to more traditional and putatively more honourable duties in the 
case of British submarines. 
 
 
The British Submarine 
In comparison with the submerged and concealed German U-boats present or worryingly 
implied within War Illustrated¶Vcover illustrations, the first occurrence of an image of a Royal 
Navy submarine showed it on the surface (fig.5). The intended use of British submarine flotillas 
for coastal defence (as envisaged by Sir John Fisher) privileged a patrolling and protective 
role21 which was indicated in this instance by the strangely paradoxical caption - µ7KH'HDGOLHVW 
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 Carlyon %HOODLUVµ7KH:DU%\6HD¶The War Illustrated vol.3 n.57 (18 September 1915), p.116. 
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20
 Ibid. 
21
 Sumida, (2003), pp.132-33. 
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Fig.5 2FWREHUµ7KH'HDGOLHVW7KLQJ7KDW.HHSVWKH6HDV¶8QLYHUVLW\RI6KHIILHOG6SHFLDO&ROOHFWLRQV 
 
Thing That Keeps the Seas ± $%ULWLVK6XEPDULQH¶22 The phrase in inverted commas seems to 
require clarification as the reader may assume in a pejorative sense that WKHµGHDGOLHVWWKLQJ¶DW
VHD ZRXOG EH D µ*HUPDQ VXEPDULQH¶ ZKLOH WKH VHD ZRXOG EH µNHSW¶ PRUH SURSHUO\ E\ Whe 
Empire¶V final guarantor, the dreadnought battleships of the Grand Fleet. Here the submarine 
appears to be domesticated by inhabiting or even usurping the role of conventional and 
honourable surface ships, not least by being seen on the surface of the sea. This defensive and 
protective role for the British submarine was also reported and reiterated in other images 
published by the magazine. A picture of a surfaced British submarine appearing in December 
FDUULHGWKHIROORZLQJFDSWLRQµ$ZDUWLPHSKotograph of a unit in the submarine fleetthat 
guards our coasts taken from a cross-Channel steamer when German submarines were known 
WREHRSHUDWLQJLQWKHDUHD¶23 The paradoxical, reassuring visibility of the British submarine 
appears to be presented in this instance as an equal or comparison to surface patrol craft when 
LQUHDOLW\WKHVXEPHUVLEOHFUDIW¶VPLOLWDU\XWLOLW\OD\LQLWVDELOLWLHVWRREVHUYHDQGDPEXVKIURP
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 The War Illustrated vol.1 n.11 (31 October 1914). 
23
 The War Illustrated vol.1 n.18 (21 December 1914), p.416. 
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positions of hiding. This contemporary characterisation of the British submarine in a defensive 
role and in plain sight underlined the problems and ambiguities of the introduction of this 
LQQRYDWLYHZHDSRQWRWKH5R\DO1DY\¶VIOHHWDVPXFKDVWRWKRVHRILWVHQHPLHV 
 
7KHVXEPDULQH¶VDSSHDUDQFHLQWKH1DY\¶VRUGHURIEDWWOHSURYRNHGSUREOHPV for 
British concepts of national identity as the submarine threatened the supremacy of 
the battleship. This made the submarine unpopular as any threat to the Royal Navy 
XQGHUPLQHGLPSRUWDQWLGHDVUHJDUGLQJWKHIUHHGRPWRXVHWKHVHD%ULWDLQ¶VJOREDO
position and the Empire.  Yet the submarine in British hands was to play a part in 
protecting the British Isles and securing Britain from one of the main fears 
DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK WKH µLVODQG UDFH¶ FRPSRQHQWV RI QDWLRQDO LGHQWLW\ ± that of 
invasion.24 
 
Remarkably, the taming of the destabilising presence of the submarine in the images published 
by War Illustrated was necessitated or indeed facilitated by its integration into discourses of 
imperial identity (via protection of seaborne traffic). However, it also acknowledged 
simultaneously the 5R\DO 1DY\¶V adoption of the submarine, viewed as the weapon of the 
weaker naval power, for a coastal defensive role inseparable from other tenets of national 
identity. 
 
In line with these conspicuous early depictions of the reassuringly visible British submarine, 
other operational activities by Royal Navy submarines were often treated with a heightened 
pictorialism which also evoked comparisons with the illustrations of U-boats. The rescue by 
submarine E4 of sailors left behind in a whaler during the Battle of the Heligoland Bight was 
the subject of a full-page illustration from 1914.25  In this case the revealed interior of the 
submarine was shown as a secure, spacious and well-lit haven which, in accordance with the 
FDSWLRQ¶V GHVFULSWLRQ RI WKH VXEPDULQH¶V seemingly miraculous appearance, owed more to 
romantic fiction than to factual representation: 
 
One incident in the naval action off Heligoland on August 28th reads more like a 
Jules Verne romance than cold fact. The Defender, having sunk an enemy, lowered 
DZKDOHU WRSLFNXSKHU VZLPPLQJ VXUYLYRUV $QHQHP\¶V FUXLVHU FDPHXSDQG
chased away the Defender, who was forced to abandon her whaler. Imagine the 
sailors [sic] feelings, alone in an open boat, twenty-five miles from the nearest land, 
DQGWKDWDQHQHP\¶VIRUWUHVVZLWKQRWKLQJEXWIRJDQGIRHVDURXQGWKHP6XGGHQO\
a swirl alongside, and up popped submarine E4, which opened its conning-tower, 
took them all aboard, dived, and carried then 250 miles home to Britain!26 
 
Combining and reaffirming these romantic, scientific and novelistic representations of the 
submarine was a full-page DUWLVW¶V illustration published in 1916. Again the decidedly 
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unrealistically large, airy and clean interior of a submarine was revealed in detail by the artist 
and described by the caption in adulatory terms: 
  
If science and romance are at variance in land warfare, they seem to be singularly 
reconciled at sea. Surely the submarine, if the most deadly thing that keeps the sea, 
is also the most wonderful, a weapon of aggression anticipated only by novelists 
of unusual imagination.27 
 
Similar, further associations of the British submarine with last-minute life-saving and cutting- 
edge technology characterised another cover image, which referenced the raid on the German 
Zeppelin base at Cuxhaven on Christmas Day 1914 by Royal Naval Air Service floatplanes.28 
The Cuxhaven Raid, though failing to inflict any significant damage to the target, represented 
the state-of-the-art of naval warfare in being an exclusively aerial assault, launched entirely 
from ships at sea.29 When they failed to reach their parent ships after the attack, the aircrews 
were rescued by submarines: War Illustrated¶VFRYHUGHSLFWHGDSLORWEHLQJZHOFRPHGDERDUd 
E\DVXEPDULQHUZLWKWKHFDSWLRQµ2XU6DLORUVRIWKH8QGHU-seas Rescue our Sailors of the 
6NLHV¶30 
 
The further associations of the British submarine with technical innovation and individual 
daring were documented frequently in WKH PDJD]LQH¶V written and visual reporting.  In 
distinction from the U-ERDW¶V DVVRFLDWLRQV ZLWK surreptitiousness activity and underhanded-
ness, the solitary actions of British submarines and submariners were characterised positively 
by stealth and daring. For example the sinking of a Turkish warship by submarine B11 after 
WKHQDYLJDWLRQRIDPLQHILHOGDQGDµUHFRUGVXEPHUVLRQRIQLQHKRXUV¶ZDVGHVFULEHGDVµDWUXO\
glorious feat, worthy of the greatest traditions of the greatest of sea powers¶.31 However, the 
celebration of this exploit and the marrying of modern submarine warfare with the traditions 
of the Navy did not preclude, or perhaps demanded, the diminution of the threat the new 
technology posed: 
 
By skilful manoeuvring and a special hull protected by a 4in steel plating, fast 
battleships can do much to guard against the invisible peril of the torpedo. That our 
ships have been able successfully to bombard the Belgian coast, exposed all the 
time to submarine attack, without meeting the fate of the Hogue, Cressy and 
Aboukir, is unquestionably a great tribute to British seamanship.32 
 
Curiously, within only a few months of its occurrence, the debacle of the torpedoing of the 
three cruisers was being alluded to in order to celebrate traditional naval skill rather than 
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condemn contemporary naval leadership. In retrospect this shift appears all the more marked 
JLYHQ WKH PDJD]LQH¶V VXEVHTXHQW UHSRUWLQJ RI QXPHURXV VXFFHVVIXO DWWDFNV E\ %ULWLVK
submarines on German warships, in an inverted parallel with the threat posed by U-boats. 
 
 
Fig.6 12 February 1916 µHumanity and Heroism of British Submarine Sailors in the North Sea and Baltic¶
(University of Sheffield Special Collections) 
 
Extending the glorification of the achievements and verve of British submariners, a double- 
page spread (fig.6) from 1916 represented the recent activities of British submarines using a 
combination of photographs and drawings.33 Tellingly, the top row of photographs shows 
British submariners rescuing German survivors from a ship they have sunk in the North Sea: 
SODLQO\ µKXPDQLW\¶ WRRN SUHFHGHQFH HYHQ WR µKHURLVP¶ in the conduct of British submarine 
operations.34 Operating against warships and merchant traffic in the harsh weather conditions 
documented by the pictures, British submarines were particularly successful in the Baltic 
during 1915, conducting a series of isolated but highly disruptive attacks.35 Prominently 
identified within these pictures is Lieutenant Commander Max Horton, captain of E.9 and 
originator of the Jolly Roger in British submarine culture, who had already achieved success 
in sinking German warships at sea in 1914.36 The influence of only a very small contingent of 
Royal Navy submarines was felt upon the operations and composure of the German Navy: 
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7KH*HUPDQVLQWKH%DOWLFQRZKDGDQDWWDFNRI³VXEPDULQH-LWLV´similar to that 
which plagued the Grand Fleet that autumn. On 19th October [1914] there were 
positive reports of periscopes and torpedo tracks in Kiel Bay [«] The presence of 
a mere two submarines [E.1 and E.9] complicated ± but did not stop ± German 
operations at sea for the remainder of the year.37 
 
The positive comparison of British to German submarine operations had already been initiated 
in the magazine by the reporting of achievements in both daring intelligence gathering and the 
sinking of German warships during 1915. War Illustrated celebrated the successes of patrols 
in the Baltic and the Mediterranean with a collection of captioned photographs under the 
KHDGOLQHµ%ULWLVK6XEPDULQHVWXUQ7DEOHVRQ9RQ7LUSLW]¶38 Remarkably, this tendency in War 
Illustrated¶V UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ of British submarines continued onward through the conflict, 
despite or perhaps because of the increasing seriousness and demonization of the German U-
ERDWV¶DFWLYLWLHV. In 1917, with a page of photographs detailing their shore side maintenance 
duties, British submariners weUHURPDQWLFLVHGDVµPHUPHQ¶.39 As late as 1918, during the U-
ERDWV¶ most effective and destructive unrestricted campaign against Allied shipping, the 
µDGYHQWXUHV¶ RI %ULWLVK VXEPDULQHUV ZHUH still being described innocuously in terms of 
nonchalant heroism and easily obtained success.40 While championing the British submarine 
for its achievements in the very role (the destruction of enemy warships) which had haunted 
the imagination of the Royal Navy and its readership, War Illustrated continued to both 
romanticise and heroically understate the figure of the British submarine, visually and verbally. 
This approach was juxtaposed against the PDJD]LQH¶V mystification, demonization and 
magnification of the status of the German U-boat. 
 
Submarine/Anti-Submarine Warfare 
In comparison with the maJD]LQH¶V often exaggerated use of illustrations, the inclusion of 
verifying photographic images may suggest a more objective and factual grounding to war 
reporting. A page from late 1915 formed a striking companion to images from the first year of 
the war in cataloguing and contextualising U-boat operations through a selection of German 
photographs (fig.7). These revealed the inside of the submarine¶VFRPSDUWPHQWV, as well as the 
munitions factory where the torpedoes were manufactured. Disquietingly, three of these images 
connected the U-boat commander at the periscope, a reproduction of a ship viewed through the 
periscope, and an annotated photograph of a torpedo striking its target, thus presenting British 
readers with a simulation of the sequence of submarine attack, and allowing them to inhabit 
WKHHQHP\¶VSHUVSHFWLYH vicariously. The dispassionate verbal description in the accompanying 
captions added to the disturbing facsimile of this operational process: 
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)LJ$XJXVWµ+RZWKH8 Boat Terror wUHDNV'HVWUXFWLRQ¶8QLYHUVLW\RI6KHIILHOG6SHFLDO&ROOHFWLRQV 
 
Remarkable photograph taken from a German submarine of a ship actually being 
torpedoed. The dreaded trail of silver is the track of the torpedo, and the column of 
water is the effect of the torpedo striking its mark.41 
 
A far more conventional viewing position for the reader to occupy was exemplified by a 
dramatic two-page art work, which represented the story of the armed collier Wandle fighting 
off a surfaced U-boat. A small inset photograph showed WKHVKLS¶VFDSWDLQFDUULHGVKRXOGHU
high on his return home. Although this vivid illustration was typical of many throughout the 
entire wartime run of the magazine, this example was remarkable for its valorisation of the 
ships attacked by and fighting back against the U-ERDWV  QRW WKH 5R\DO 1DY\¶V ILUVW UDQN
warships, but merchant ships and auxiliaries at the sharp end of the antisubmarine war as the 
conflict entered its third year. The widespread arming of merchant ships which was instituted 
as the only logical, deterrent response to U-boats attacking merchantmen in accordance with 
prize rules, was itself an escalatory factor contributing to the declaration of unrestricted 
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submarine warfare in 1917.42 War Illustrated provided a vindicatory visual report of the 
extension of armament to merchant shipping.43 Defending the necessity of this measure in the 
face of the increasing effectiveness of U-boat attacks, Carlyon Bellairs perhaps unwittingly 
admitted the intractability of the problem, and the relative impotence of the Navy to address it:  
µ7KHPerchant ships have no other resource but what is contained in their own hulls and what 
the Navy may provide, international law having proved itself both a snare and a delusion¶.44   
 
The assertion of these inescapable µIDFWV¶ LJQRUHGRU IRUFHIXOO\REVFXUHG others, such as an 
acknowledgement that very few submarines had been successfully detected, engaged and 
destroyed to date. Statistics appeared to suggest that armed merchant ships were less 
vulnerable, but the remedial action of arming them, and attempting to force the U-boat to cease 
its predations within the procedures of prize rules, in actually prompted the full exploitation of 
WKH VXEPDULQH¶V XQLTXH DQG SRWHQWLDOO\ ZDU-winning capabilities, by provoking more 
submerged, surprise torpedo attacks.45 Perversely, the impact of the desperation measure of 
arming of merchant vessels acted to enhance the persuasive potential of a decisive unrestricted 
U-boat campaign for German\¶V wartime leadership.46 Equally, even before the furore created 
by the sinking of Aboukir, Cressy and Hogue, there had been proposals for a ruthless submarine 
campaign intended to terrorise Allied and neutral shipping into immobility.47 The unleashing 
of the 1917 unrestricted U-boat campaign allied to the expanded prosecution of submerged 
torpedo attacks finally brought to light the full, arguably already anticipated, magnitude of the 
VXEPDULQHµSHULO¶. It presented the Royal Navy with a challenge to which, initially at least, its 
countermeasures, tactics, technological developments and resources proved wholly unequal.48 
 
Nonetheless, within the pages of War Illustrated the battle against the U-boats was being 
carried and won, but by a fleet of underdogs rather than by the regular, first-rate Navy. Two 
illustrations from 1917, the year in which shipping losses became genuinely critical to the 
continued pursuit of the war, exemplify this trend. A cover image of a small coastal craft racing 
to engage a surfaced U-ERDWZLWKWKHWLWOHµ$0DWFKIRUWKH3LUDWH%ULWLVK0RWRU-%RDW6FRUHV¶
celebrated WKHKHURLVPRIWKH1DY\¶VGDVKLQJpatrol forces.49 Another illustration accompanied 
by a lengthy caption related a fanciful tale of a trawler which had bravely and vainly fought 
four submarines singlehandedly (fig.8) $IWHU GHVFULELQJ WKLV VKLS¶V XQHTXDO struggle, the 
accompanying text ended with the following valediction  µLI KHU FUHZ DUHQRWSULVRQHUV LQ
Germany, they are at the bottom of the sea with their gallant boat¶.50 
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Fig.8 26 May 1917 µOne Trawler that Tackled Four U boats at Once¶8QLYHUVLW\of Sheffield Special Collections) 
 
This championing of an unlikely British maritime David pitted against the immoral German 
submarine Goliath was frequently recapitulated in War Illustrated¶V DUWLVWV¶ ZRUN, 
accompanying morale boosting but unconvincing tales. In another two-page spread, also from 
the months of the highest merchant ship losses during the unrestricted U-boat campaign, naval 
auxiliaries, merchant ships and British submarines were pictured engaged in the struggle 
against the U-boats, and either capturing them, driving them off or sinking them (fig.9). These 
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)LJ2FWREHUµ6FHQHVLQWKH:DU$ERYHDQG8QGHU:DWHU6XFFHVVIXO)LJKWV:LWK(QHP\6XEPDULQHV¶
(University of Sheffield Special Collections) 
 
LPDJHVDOOQRWDEO\DUWLVWV¶LOOXVWUDWLRQVUDWKHUWKDQSKRWRJUDSKVGHSLFWHGWKH8ERDWVEHLQJ
opposed, thwarted, destroyed or forced to surrender in a stirring catalogue or material and 
moral victory. In addition to a French coaster defending herself from attack, a British patrol 
craft and a British submarine were depicted sinking U boats in surface combat.  
 
Elsewhere the high-technology narrative associated with the submarine was revived in the 
description of the innovations introduced to oppose it. In illustrations published in 1917, the 
application of airpower, and the invention of underwater detection devices were portrayed in 
detail. These innovations were described ZLWKRSWLPLVPDVµLPSRUWDQWDLGV LQmastering the 
submarine trouble¶.51 However, the seaplane was depicted flying over ships which were still 
not in convoy, and the annotated drawing of the hydrophone-equipped search ship did not show 
any depth-charges, or any other way to attack a submarine unless it surfaced. While in 
retrospect such examples readily suggest the intended propaganda value of portraying inferior 
or inadequate forces valiantly combatting the ruthlessness RIWKHHQHP\¶VVXEPDULQHV, and the 
propaganda need to portray the submarine peril being brought under control, the incidents 
depicted here bear little relationship to actual U boat losses. While aircraft proved effective in 
the anti-submarine war in reconnaissance and deterrence effect, they did not contribute 
significantly to U boat sinkings.52  
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Such optimistic descriptions of possible countermeasures and indeed the downplaying of the 
threat posed by the submarine in the first place could not detract from the growing awareness 
of the dire threat posed by the high level of shipping losses during 1917. At the height of the 
U-boat campaign and the nadir of the war in Britain, the appearance of an article by the Daily 
Mail¶VQDYDOFRUUHVSRQGHQWHerbert Wilson displayed desperation at the apparent absence of 
any remedy to the submarine-inflicted losses, and expressed grave, heretical doubt in the 
strategy and image of the British Navy: 
 
2XUILUVWDQGPRVWSUHVVLQJQHFHVVLW\LVWRGHIHDWWKHVXEPDULQHFDPSDLJQ>«@LILW
be not defeated then all our sea power is in vain. The forty-four British 
Dreadnoughts might as well be at the bottom of the sea; the war will be lost; and 
the British Empire will be shattered and sundered into fragments. Is there any sign 
whatever that our methods are getting the better of the submarines?53 
 
The reality and insolubility of the U-boat offensive was captured in this montage of 
photographs detailing the destruction of French transport ship in the Mediterranean in 
September 1917,QEOHDNO\QHXWUDOODQJXDJHWKHµUHPDUNDEOHUDSLGLW\¶RIKHUVLQNLQJWKHORVV
RIOLYHVDQGWKHVKLS¶VYXOQHUDELOLW\ in carrying munitions were recorded: µ,PDJLQDWLRQLV
hardly equal to the task of visualising the horror added by fire to a sinking vessel which has 
H[SORVLYHVRQERDUG¶54 If in 1915 War Illustrated had provided its readers with a disconcerting 
FRQQHFWLRQZLWKWKH8ERDW¶V perspective in its diagrammatic treatment of a submarine attack, 
in this example from 1918 it required them to view and envisage a sinking ship shown with 
photographic authenticity, but from a temporal and spatial distance redolent of horror, pity and 
powerlessness. The submarine, visible only through the aftermath of its attack, arguably 
achieved a more significant impact in photographic evidence rather than in artistic 
exaggeration. 
 
As well as openly fearing the loss of the entire war on the basis of failure to tackle the U-boats, 
Wilson¶s commentary mimicked several others in seeking an antidote to the effectiveness of 
the VXEPDULQH LQD UHFRXUVH WR µRIIHQVLYHDFWLRQ¶ IRUH[DPSOHE\GUHDGQRXJKW UDWKHU WKDQ
apparently futile defensive antisubmarine measures. PHUFHSWLRQVRIWKHVXEPDULQH¶VLQQRYDWLve 
and distinctive difference did not prevent and perhaps arguably inspired a regressive 
concentration on the conventional, depreciated means of sea power closer to norms of both 
warfare and identity. Equally retrograde in this respect were the images and words which 
characterised the submarine war in the last months of the conflict. German submarines 
continued WREHGHPRQLVHGDQGHXSKHPLVHGDVSLUDWHV MDFNDOVDQGµ+XQ KLJKZD\PHQ¶DQG
their targets were re-imagined as innocent and vulnerable civilians depicted in images 
reminiscent of alleged atrocities in Europe in the first year of the war, and of the Lusitania 
sinking.55 The defeat and surrender of the U-boats in 1918 was reported in War Illustrated with 
conclusive moral righteousness, but the arrival and internment of the surrendered battleships 
of the High Seas Fleet, described unapologetically as a victory as significant and historic as 
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Trafalgar, received substantially greater coverage.56 Even a bloodless victory vested in the 
VXSHULRULW\RI%ULWDLQ¶VEDWWOHIOHHWDSSHDUHGSUHIHUDEOHWRDUHPLQGHURIDYHU\QHDU-defeat at 
the hands of the German submarine. 
 
Conclusion 
The peculiarities and consistencies of War Illustrated¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKHsubmarine on both 
sides of the First World War UHIOHFW WKH PDJD]LQH¶V GHILQLWLRQV DQG GHSLFWLRQV RI ZDU
technology, as inflected by crucial constructions and characterisations of national identity and 
morality.  By turns its aggrandizement and dismissal of the danger embodied in the U-boat, via 
emotive and striking visual illustration and verbal address, are indicative of the mystique of the 
submarine and its captivation of the British readership, in rivalry with the pride and patriotic 
investment in the surface ships of the Royal Navy. The extensive coverage and exaggerated 
interpretations of the submarine were also used to differentiate and dynamise other wartime 
discourses incorporated by War Illustrated in its undeniable propaganda role. 
 
In his retrospective account of the U-boat campaign against British shipping and the 
countermeasures eventually taken to defeat it, John Jellicoe noted the comparative lack of 
impact which German submarines made in the first half of the conflict and, crucially, drew 
distinctions between the tactics they employed: 
 
Whilst the enemy's campaign against merchant shipping always gave rise to 
anxiety, there were certain periods of greatly increased activity. During the summer 
months of 1916 the losses from submarine attack and from submarine-laid mines 
were comparatively slight, and, in fact, less than during the latter half of 1915, but 
in the autumn of 1916 they assumed very serious proportions.57 
 
In analysing the period before the acceleration of the rate of sinkings in autumn 1916, which 
anticipated the full-EORZQµFULVLV¶RIRFFDVLRQHGE\WKH*HUPDQGHFODUDWLRQRIXQUHVWULFWHG
submarine warfare, Jellicoe pointed out that not only were the U-ERDWV¶ SUHGDWLRQV QRW
substantial enough to cause alarm, their attacks were mostly effected from the surface, rather 
than submerged. These factors in turn provoked only piecemeal, palliative measures rather than 
curative ones from the British side: 
 
In the years 1915 and 1916, however, only 21 and 29 per cent, respectively of the 
British merchant ships sunk by enemy submarines were destroyed without 
warning, whilst during the first four months of the unrestricted submarine warfare 
in 1917 the figure rose to 64 per cent., and went higher and higher as the months 
progressed. Prior to February, 1917, the more general method of attack on ships 
was to µEULQJ WKHP WR¶ by means of gun-fire; they were then sunk by gun-fire, 
torpedo, or bomb. This practice necessitated the submarine being on the surface, 
                                                          
56
 $QRQ\PRXVµ6RPH$UULYDOVDW³U Boat Avenue´+DUZLFK¶; µ%ULWDLQ¶V0RVW*ORULRXV+RXU6LQFH
7UDIDOJDU¶War Illustrated album de luxe vol.10, ed. by J.A. Hammerton (London: Amalgamated Press, 
1919), pp.3453-4. 
57
 John Jellicoe, The Crisis of the Naval War (London: Cassell, 1920), p.4. 
20 
 
and so gave a merchant ship defensively armed a chance of replying to the gun-fire 
and of escaping, and it also gave armed decoy ships a good opportunity of 
successful action if the submarine could be induced to close to very short range.58 
 
The desire to cure the submarine menace by resort to a surface battle epitomised a conventional 
and aggressive response to an unconventional, defensive challenge: in some ways the arming 
of merchant ships compounded rather than cured the problem of the submarine, and provoked 
the full exploitation of its technological advantages in stealth and weaponry.  Ironically, in 
answer to the contemporary and retrospective views of the virtues of offensive action to win 
the war at sea through battleship action, Arthur Marder suggested that a victory at Jutland might 
well have been decisive for the anti-submarine war:  without the need to screen the 
GUHDGQRXJKWVIRUIOHHWDFWLRQWKH5R\DO1DY\¶VGHVWUR\HUVFRXOGKDYHEHHQUHOHDVHGWRFRQYR\
duty much sooner.59 
 
Reflecting on the submarine menace after the war, John JelOLFRHREVHUYHGWKDWµ,WLVSHUKDSVDV
well that the nation generally remained to a great extent unconscious of the extreme gravity of 
WKHVLWXDWLRQ¶.60 The evolution of War Illustrated¶Vreporting of the submarine (from dismissal 
of its danger, to condemnation of its µFRZDUGO\¶DQGµSLUDWLFDO¶GHSOR\PHQWWRFHOHEUDWLRQRI
its embodiment of technological advancement, and eventual acknowledgement of its 
disproportionate and potentially decisive impact) reflects the divisive characteristics and 
perceptions of submarine warfare, and also the troubled reputation of the Royal Navy in the 
contemporary public imagination. The difficulty of placing the (British) submarine within the 
hierarchy of military and national discourses afflicted the Royal Navy itself as much as 
publications such as War Illustrated attempting to represent it: 
 
The effort by the Royal Navy to develop a fleet submarine ceases to be an 
operational and technical matter and instead becomes one of how the Royal Navy 
imagined the conduct of maritime warfare and attempted to shape the submarine to 
fit this ideal.61 
 
Set against its careful handling of the perceived inactivity of the battle fleets of both sides, the 
submarine is represented in War Illustrated as an embryonic, exotic and ultimately influential 
factor in the naval war. Within the first eighteen months of the conflict, several connected and 
occasionally interdependent submarine discourses emerge discernibly within War Illustrated¶V
reporting:  the elevation of the submarine as an unprecedented military technology; the keen 
moral dilemmas of rationalising and accommodating its key attributes of stealth and surprise; 
and integration of the new weapon system into positive and negative propaganda narratives, 
both in its use by Britain and her allies and in the delineation of countermeasures to its effects. 
This extensive, prominent and cumulative coverage clearly conveys the fascination with and 
importance of the submarine, and would appear to entirely acknowledge and broadcast the 
µJUDYLW\¶ RI WKH 8-boat threat of which Jellicoe was so conscious 7KH PDJD]LQH¶V WH[WXDO
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properties and individual topical choices (between text and image, illustration and 
photography) in relation to specific subjects, can be seen to be crucial to palpable tonal 
variations in the representation of the submarine. Submarines are embodiments of war effort 
and war ethos (symbolising mobilised technology and unified tactics) as well as embodiments 
of national character (representing moral or immoral, noble or despicable, heroic or cowardly 
activities). They are also totems in a conflict marked by rapid, transformational, passionate and 
intimidating applications, exploitations and interpretations of technology.  Within the context 
of the failure of the respective battle fleets to intervene decisively in the naval war, it would 
appear to be have been preferable to think of the submarine as capable and respectable enough 
to µkeep the sea¶, rather than as deadly and dishonourable enough to take it away. 
 
 
